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*E.C.L.R. 384 1. Introduction
On November 24, 2014, the Brussels Court of Commerce (the Brussels Court) dismissed the
European Commission’s (Commission) own claim for antitrust damages in respect of the harm
inflicted by the elevators and escalators cartels.1 Readers will recall that in 2007, the
Commission had slapped a close to €1 billion fine on four manufacturers of lifts and elevators
who had unlawfully colluded in public tenders launched by the EU institutions.2
The timing of the Brussels Court judgment is particularly interesting. It comes only weeks
after the Commission passed a successful legislative Directive on antitrust damages that
purports to promote private enforcement. With this judgment, some may find evidence that
this bill was well needed. Others will in contrast read in the judgment a confirmation that
antitrust damages litigation is a doomed enterprise, and that the Directive is unlikely to ever
improve this.
With this background, this article offers a comprehensive review of the Brussels Court
judgment. The structure of the paper is as follows. (1) Part I gives a concise overview of the
facts; (2) Part II summarises and discusses the assessment of the Brussels Court with a
particular focus on evidence analysis; (3) Part III provides a more economic perspective on
incomplete bid-rigging cartels; (4) and concludes (5).
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2. Facts
In 2007 the Commission found that the elevators manufacturers KONE, Otis, Schindler and
ThyssenKrupp (KOST),3 had committed an infringement of art.101 TFEU from 1996 to 2004
in Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The companies had agreed to: (i)
allocate public tenders between themselves and other contracts for the sale, installation and
servicing of elevators and escalators; (ii) not to compete with each other; and (iii) had
exchanged commercially sensitive information. The Commission fined the four elevators
manufacturers a total amount of €992 million. This fine constituted a record-high fine at that
time.
Shortly thereafter, the Commission filed a claim for damages before the Brussels Court
against the cartel participants. The action for damages was lodged on behalf of the European
Institutions. They had presumably suffered additional costs in several calls for tenders in
relation to elevators and escalators. Interestingly, the Commission claimed that its own calls
for tenders had been affected by the artificial market allocation: the Commission had
concluded agreements with several of the undertakings for the maintenance and the
modernisation of its elevators during the infringement period.
In support of its action, the Commission sought the expert assistance of an economic
consultancy firm, which was tasked with estimating the damages presumably inflicted by the
cartel on the European Institutions. The report of the economic consultancy (the MAPP
report) concluded that: (i) the characteristics of the affected markets by the cartel suggested
that it had a considerable influence on the price paid by the Commission; and (ii) measured
the damages that the cartel had caused to the European Institutions on the basis of a
statistical analysis of some of the maintenance contracts from 1997 until 2003.
On the basis of the MAPP report, the Commission sought to obtain the nullity of the contracts
entered into with KOST based on fraud,4 as well as damages in the ballpark of €6 million.
According to the Commission, the*E.C.L.R. 385  damages corresponded to the cartel price
mark-up paid by the European Institutions for the maintenance contracts of its different
buildings, both in Brussels and Luxembourg.
KOST contested both the existence and the amount of the claimed damages, as well as the
causal link between the infringement and the damages.
3. Assessment by the national court
(i) Interim judgment of the Brussels Court and preliminary references before the CJEU
Readers will recall that the proceedings did not start very smoothly. In the early days of the
procedure, KOST disputed the Commission’s standing in the proceedings in its capacity to act
as the representative of the European Institutions. Further, KOST claimed that the
Commission did not have an express authorisation from the other European Institutions that
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had suffered harm as a result of the infringement. The cartelists also contended that the
Commission was infringing the principles of judicial independence and equality of arms.
Those early allegations led the Brussels Court to stay proceedings, issue an interim
judgment5 and refer two preliminary questions to the CJEU concerning the authority of the
Commission to represent the European Institutions, and the right to a fair trial.6
In response to the Brussels Court, the CJEU first recalled that it was clear from the wording of
art.282 EC that if the EU was to be a party to legal proceedings before a national court then it
ought to be represented by the Commission.7
Secondly, the CJEU maintained that the effective enforcement of competition law requires
that any party can seek damages caused by any infringement of competition law provisions,
in line with its Manfredi case law.8 Consequently, the right to a fair trial, as guaranteed by
art.47 of the Charter of Fundamental rights and art.6 of the European Treaty on Human
Rights is not infringed when the Commission introduces an action for damages to redress an
infringement that has been established by its own decision.
The CJEU recalled the Manfredi case law that provides the framework for such actions.
Damages will only be awarded when the three following elements are present: (i) a harmful
event (i.e. the concerted practice); (ii) the existence of damages; and (iii) a direct causal
link. The infringement of art.101 TFEU as established in the Commission’s Decision allowed
the Belgian judge to limit its assessment to the existence of damages and the causality link.9
That said, the fact that the Commission has established the existence of a harmful event in
its decision and that the national judge is bound by it does not prevent the national judge
from judging independently on the existence and the quantum of these damages and the
causal link. Indeed, whether a national judge can review the infringement decision is only a
matter of distribution of competences between the national judge and the European Union
judge. This distribution of competences consequently does not lead to the conclusion that the
Commission is judge and party in its own case.
Ultimately, the CJEU recognised that the Commission was not infringing the principle of
equality of arms. The Commission had not used any information obtained during the
investigation conducted against KOST for the infringement decision to sustain its damages
claim.
(ii) Legal qualification of the claim under Belgian law based on article 1382 of the
Belgian Civil Code (CC)
Let us now revert to the Brussels Court’s judgment. For a start, the Brussels Court recalls
that to establish personal liability a claimant must, under Belgian tort law, demonstrate that
three conditions are met: (a) a harmful event; (b) damages (loss suffered) and a causal link
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between both. If a claimant cannot prove the existence of those three cumulative conditions,
it cannot be awarded any damages and as a consequence (c) "the loss rests were it falls".10
(a) Harmful event
The first liability condition is swiftly dealt with. As explained above, the Brussels Court is
bound by the Commission’s Decision.11 The anti-competitive nature of the agreements
between the cartelists on the Belgian market thus qualifies as a harmful event, which
automatically gives rise to civil liability when the harm is caused.
(b) Damages and causal link
By virtue of the EU general principle of procedural autonomy, national law governs the
assessment of damages and of the causal link. The Brussels Court*E.C.L.R. 386  however
reminds that its analysis needs to comply with the principles of equality and effectiveness, as
stated in Manfredi.
On damages, the Belgian CC provides no definition. This notion has been developed in the
case law and doctrine. The Belgian Court of Cassation defined damages as any loss or right
impairment that belongs to anyone’s patrimony or the loss of an advantage that could have
been legitimately expected.12 It is therefore a large concept that should be assessed on a
case-by-case basis. Under Belgian law there is a difference between "the certainty on the
existence of damages" and "the certainty on its quantum". This seeks to ensure that lack of
certainty (or indeterminacy) of the quantum does not prevent the victim from compensation.
Both the existence of the damage, as well as its quantum, are assessed in a discretionary
way by the Belgian judge.
The objective of a damages claim is to replace the injured parties as much as possible into
the position where they would have been had the harmful event not occurred. The
compensation of the injured parties is therefore the main objective of the claim for damages.
On causation, the claimant should demonstrate the damages suffered and should not simply
make it hypothetically. Therefore, under Belgian law,13 the main question for the assessment
of the alleged damages caused by the cartel entails a counterfactual analysis: what would
have happened had the infringement never occurred. Hence, on the basis of an estimate, a
reference scenario should be established with which the factual situation can be compared.
This scenario is called the "non-infringement scenario" or the "counterfactual scenario".14 The
Brussels Court takes into account the specificities of the case and the proof that it disposes
of, in order to examine whether the claimant truly suffered damages that are imputable to
the infringement and if so, to determine their extent.
In this case, the Brussels Court did not dispose of direct evidence that could be relevant to
determine or estimate the damages. Even if oral evidence of witnesses could be used, the
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Commission did not provide for any of these.
(c) Evidence analysis of the Brussels Court on damages and causation
When the Commission lodged its action for damages before the Brussels Court in 2008, the
Antitrust Damages Directive15 was not yet applicable. The Brussels Court therefore excluded
the application of the Directive’s rebuttable presumption, although it embraced the idea that
a cartel generally causes damages.
In this regard, and as a general matter of law, the Brussels Court held that the economic
variables that can be considered depend on the kind of damages claimed by the applicant.
The Brussels Court finds it acceptable to consider that in general cartels raise prices, but it
argues that prices are rarely determined by one factor.
To assess a price increase or overcharge, a non-infringing price is used as the reference for a
comparison with the actual prices paid by consumers. Nevertheless, the Brussels Court
considers that it is impossible to determine with certainty how the market would have
evolved absent an infringement of art.101 TFEU. Prices, sales volumes and profit margins
depend on several complex factors where the strategic interactions between participants of
the market play a fundamental role. Moreover, these factors are difficult to assess. The
hypothetical non-infringement scenario therefore relies on different uncertain assumptions.
In casu, the Brussels Court emphasised that: (i) the cartel consisted of a market allocation
for tender procedures, i.e. a bid-rigging and an "atypical" price-fixing practice; (ii) that the
damages claimed should eventually amount to the overcharge paid by the EU Institutions;
and (iii) that the alleged damages only related to the maintenance of existing elevators and
escalators.
With these elements in hand, the Brussels Court then proceeded to the analysis and rejection
of all the evidence provided by the Commission. In particular, the Brussels Court makes the
decision of the Commission its own, and dismisses the normal course of (market) practices
and the economic reports advocating damages or a loss of opportunity.
The Elevators decision of the Commission and the MAPP report
Under Belgian law, the "normal market practices" standard is well-known in the sense of
art.1349 CC. In short, if an action generally causes damages the causal link can be proven
invoking that under the normal course of market practices this action generally causes
damages. A contrario, the burden of proof is reversed if the defendant invokes a fact contrary
to the normal market practices.
The principle entails that contracts concluded during the period of the cartel are necessarily
influenced by the cartel. And these contracts should lead to higher prices than contracts
concluded in a free market without distortions of competition. This is nothing but a basic
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economic assumption: the cartel allocating markets implies, de facto, a decrease in the
number of players on the supply side, thereby increasing prices on the demand
side.*E.C.L.R. 387 
The Brussels Court further explains that agreements on the allocation of public and private
tenders might indeed have an impact on the price stemming from the "cartelized contracts".
Nevertheless, the Brussels Court highlights that one of the studies presented by the
Commission states that in the case of a bid-rigging cartel an effect on price cannot simply be
accepted when 30 per cent of competitors do not participate in the cartel. Referring to a
study from the competition consultancy agent OXERA, which was prepared for the
Commission in 2009,16 the Brussels Court embraces the idea that in case of public tenders
with competitors falling outside of the cartel, this might have no influence on the price.
Contrary to what the Commission claimed, it does not belong to the normal course of
(market) practices that bid-rigging cartels leads to higher prices.
In support of the view that the bid-rigging practices at issue did not influence prices, the
Brussels Court stresses the inaccuracy of the Commission’s contentions17 and recalls that the
cartel consisted of 70 per cent of the market players, so that the other 30 per cent of the
players could also compete for the maintenance contracts. The Commission was therefore
wrong to allege that the four undertakings had a quasi-monopoly position and could hence
charge any price. KOST had to take into account the possible competition with the
undertakings that were not part to the cartel.
The Court even quotes the Commission’s decision to stress the difficulty of establishing the
precise effects of an infringement when the cartel does not cover the entire industry:
"In this case, the Commission did not attempt to demonstrate the precise effects of the
infringement since it is impossible to determine with sufficient certainty the relevant
competitive parameters (price, commercial terms, quality, innovation, and others) in the
absence of the infringements. However it is obvious that the infringements did have an actual
impact. The fact that the various anticompetitive arrangements were implemented by the
cartel participants in itself suggests an impact on the market, even if the actual effect is
difficult to measure, because it is, in particular, not known if and how many other projects
were subject to bid-rigging, nor how many projects may have been subject to allocation
between cartel members without there being a need for contacts between them. The high
aggregate market shares of the cartel participants make anticompetitive effects appear likely
and the relative stability of these market shares throughout the duration of the infringements
would confirm these effects."18 (emphasis added.)
Beyond the Commission’s own concession of its inability to quantify the loss, the Brussels
Court further added that even if the price increase was the sought intention of the market
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allocation scheme, it could not be directly derived from this that the cartelists had succeeded
in their intentions (specifically for maintenance contracts concluded in Belgium with the
European Institutions).
Possibly to overcome those difficulties, the Commission had ordered an expert report to
MAPP, an economic consultancy, to quantify the loss. The MAPP report covered the analysis of
a sample of 16 contracts: 11 during the existence of the cartel and 5 subsequent to the
cartel.19 The MAPP did not cover the period before the existence of the cartel (1996) and was
confined to Belgium and Luxembourg.
In what probably constitutes the core of the judgment, the Brussels Court found that the
Commission brought insufficient evidence of the "certainty" and of the "tangibility" of the
damages suffered due to the cartel. The Commission failed to provide answers to questions
relating to the overcharge of each of the maintenance contracts, or to determine which part
of the overcharge was to be considered as stemming from the cartel and which part was due
to other factors. Moreover, the evidence provided about a surplus paid during the period of
the cartel as compared to the period subsequent to its existence was neither certain, nor
tangible.
The Court also noted that the MAPP report took into consideration the data for both Belgium
and Luxembourg even though the cartels in both countries were not organised in the same
way. This was inconsistent with the Commission’s decision, which had defined both markets
as separate ones.20 The Brussels Court had therefore no other choice but to conclude that
both cartels could not have had the same average influence on the prices in both countries.
It is noteworthy that the Brussels Court expressed very strong words against the credibility of
the expert economic report. This was in particular the case in relation to the contention that
the cartel led to artificial price increases. The Commission had argued in its written pleadings
the existence of an "artificial price increase" estimated at 15 per cent and damages of €5
million caused by the cartel both for the Belgian and Luxembourg markets. Meanwhile, the
MAPP report that the Commission itself had ordered identified a surplus of 44 per cent but
estimated exact similar damages of €5 million only for the Belgian market. The Court thereby
considered that the economic expert report was overly farfetched and even questioned its
credibility. It noted that the Commission’s statement*E.C.L.R. 388 
"that the exclusion of the Luxembourg contracts does not substantially modify the estimated
surplus paid by the Claimant makes [the report] even less credible".
The Brussels Court could not therefore assume the existence of a causal link between, on the
one hand, the infringement established in the Commission’s decision and, on the other hand,
the increased price allegedly due to the maintenance contracts. For the abovementioned
reasons, the Brussels Court ruled that the Commission had not provided cogent evidence in
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support of its arguments. In particular, it observed that the Commission had not proven that
each maintenance contract was to be separately examined to consider whether a surplus was
created due to the market allocation. And it had not explained to what extent the cartel
allowed its participants to keep certain margins on the maintenance contracts without
necessarily raising the price.
The Brussels Court finally assessed the Commission’s possible loss of opportunity. Again, the
Elevators decision partly contradicted the damages claim. The Commission had explicitly
acknowledged in its decision that it was impossible to determine with sufficient certainty the
relevant competitive parameters (price, commercial terms, quality, innovation, and others) in
the absence of the infringements.21 The Brussels Court therefore argues that, at most, the
alleged harm consisted of a loss of opportunity: to avoid the surplus paid and not the surplus
in itself. The damages would then consist of the economic value of the loss of opportunity to
avoid the surplus paid, rather than the so-called overcharge (surplus) paid.
The restrictive position of the Brussels Court on the loss of opportunity follows a judgment of
the Belgian Cour de Cassation of April 1, 200422 pursuant to which, some prominent (Belgian
Civil Law) authors have argued that the (trial) judge can no longer award damages through
the loss of opportunity, in case of an uncertain causal link. This loss of opportunity can thus
not cover for the uncertainty. The Brussels Court, aligned with this school of thought, ruled
that the loss of opportunity could only be awarded when the causal link between the loss of
opportunity and the harmful event is proven and leads to damages that are real, i.e.
quantifiable. In view of the insufficient evidence provided by the Commission, the Brussels
Court rejected its claims.
4. Additional commentary
The proceedings before the Brussels Court have been concomitant to the Commission’s
legislative attempts to promote the adoption of an "Antitrust Damages Directive".23 On
November 2014, just a few days before the Brussels Court rejected the Commission’s
complaint, the Damages Directive was formally approved. Unsurprisingly, the release of the
judgment was welcomed with some irony.24 But, leaving sarcasm behind, an important
question that arises is whether the judgment would have changed had the Damages Directive
been implemented at that time.25
Let us recall a number of issues that the Directive tackles and that could have played an
important role in the proceedings before the Brussels Court. First, the Damages Directive
stipulates that victims of an infringement must have the right to claim full compensation
covering compensation for actual loss, loss of profit and interest. In order to achieve this
objective, the Directive establishes a rebuttable presumption that cartel infringements cause
harm.
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Secondly, notwithstanding this objective and the detailed provisions of the Damages
Directive, Member States retain discretion on several aspects, such as causation and the
quantification of harm to secure the effectiveness and equivalence principles.26
The Brussels judgment makes clear that the Court rejected the Commission’s action for
damages on lack of evidence and arguments brought by the claimant to prove damages (i).
But it remains uncertain from the Brussels Court’s wording whether it did not accept the
presumption that public tenders cause damages in this specific cartelised market where not
all players are involved (ii).
(i) Lack of evidence or insufficient proof
It is apparent that the Brussels Court based its assessment on the lack of evidence brought
by the Commission. The Brussels Court blamed the Commission for its failure to adequately
prove the damages caused by the surplus paid for the maintenance contracts obtained
through public tenders in this specific cartelised market in which not all players were part of
the cartel.27 The Brussels Courts painfully recalled the Commission that 30 per cent of the
market players were not involved in the cartel and could compete for the same public
tenders. Moreover, the Commission admitted in its infringement decision, that despite public
tenders being part of the cartel, their presumable surplus could hardly be assessed. It
therefore remained up to the Commission to prove the concrete existence of its incurred
damages.
(ii) The presumption that bid-rigging cartels cause damages
The Brussels Court simply refutes that contracts obtained through public tenders in this
specific cartelized market in which not all players were involved can be affected by*E.C.L.R.
389  the cartel. This idea is likely to generate discussion. It can be considered both from a
legal (a) and economic perspective (b)
(a) Legal analysis
Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003 states that
"(w)hen national courts rule on agreements, decisions or practices under Article 101 or Article
102 of the Treaty which are already the subject of a Commission decision, they cannot take
decisions running counter to the decision adopted by the Commission".
This rule means that a plaintiff does not have to prove the infringement again, only that she
has suffered damages from it.28 As a consequence, the Brussels Court was right to follow the
Commission’s assessment in its infringement decision, wherein it decided that the cartel also
included the market allocation for public tenders. However, art.16 does not diminish the
judge’s power of appraisal. In particular, he remains free to assess the damages resulting
from the harmful event and the causality link between both.29
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(b) The economic perspective
The Brussels Court erred in considering that no surplus can derive from a bid-rigging cartel
that does not involve all market players. Indeed, the Brussels Court appeared to be
concerned with: (i) the bid-rigging nature of the cartel; and (ii) cartel incompleteness.
(i) The bid-rigging nature of the cartel
Economic theory, and a sense of logic too, demonstrate that cartel duration is an indicator of
its success or profitability to its members. Essentially, the effectiveness of a cartel stems from
its overcharge, i.e. the price increase that its members can obtain due to their collusive
conduct. Driven by the objective of joint profit maximisation, firms collude, and collude for
long periods of time.30 The elevators cartel was in force for seven years and eight months
until the Commission started its investigation. Had the cartelists not been able to benefit from
the cartel due to the competitive pressure from cartel outsiders, they would have rationally
put an end to it.31 Since we do not have access to the specific data set of the cartels, we can
only assume a number of advantageous variables for the cartelists, such as lower costs,
economies of scale or output constraints as compared to the outsider(s).32
The bid-rigging cartel at issue was mainly characterised, but not only, by a set of phantom
bidding schemes. Under these schemes cartelists would submit artificial high bids to manifest
presence of competition and designated a winner among them that would submit the lower
bid in that auction.33 By their very nature, phantom bidding schemes require more
communication and explicit discussion of prices amongst the cartelists. However—quite
counter-intuitively—antitrust authorities have more difficulties to detect collusion when there
is more communication between cartel members, as it creates an appearance of
competition.34
Regarding the first concern, the Brussels Court refers to a relevant passage of the Oxera
study, which the Commission had ordered and wherein it was stated that
"there is a small but significant proportion of cartels (7%) where there is no overcharge.
Whether a particular cartel falls into this category would need to be explored on a case-by-
case basis".
By referring to this passage it appears that the Brussels Court wants to emphasise it is no
task from any court to come up with prove for damages that a victim allegedly incurred. Still,
it can be derived from the overall context of the judgment that the Brussels Court seems—to
say the least—very reluctant to accept the existing recent economic theory showing that bid-
rigging cartels lead to overcharges. Furthermore, it is widely believed that bid rigging leads to
higher overcharges than other types of collusive activities. Interestingly, in a recent empirical
analysis of cartel overcharges Bolotova (2009) corroborates the wide believe that bid rigging
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leads to ["slightly"] higher overcharges than non-bid-rigging cartels.35
Lastly, it is noteworthy that the US Sentencing Commission believes that the seriousness of
bid-rigging cases is often understated. For this reason, the US Sentencing Commission has
specified a 1-level increase for bid-rigging in the submission of non-competitive bids.36 Bid-
rigging cartels face higher fines as compared to other types of cartels.*E.C.L.R. 390 
(ii) Cartel incompleteness
The second concern of the Brussels Court lies on the incompleteness of the cartel. In fact,
KOST accounted for approximately 71 per cent by volume of maintenance services of
elevators and escalators in Belgium.37 The concern of the Brussels Court is not moot, as a
cartel that does not involve all the potential bidders may lose the bidding even when it bids in
excess of the reserve price. When the cartel is set up only to obtain one tender, the concern
of the Brussels Court could be justified. Indeed, in a one-stage game where competitors
outside the cartel cannot track an evolution of a set of cartelised prices, they could not
eventually follow a non-existent cartelised market trend. Nevertheless, as the Commission
showed in its decision, the duration of the cartel affected a large number of tender
procedures.
In the markets under scrutiny, we can consider that in an auction market characterised by an
oligopolistic number of participants—irrespective of their participation to a cartel—and with
relatively homogeneous products or services, all participants to the tender would have been
able to recognise the winning price to the tender. This understanding of the market is
acceptable, considering that an auction market with a small number of players lends itself to
transparency and therefore to knowledge of competitors’ product prices.
Let us therefore assume that the outsider knows of the existence of the cartel and is capable
of foreseeing price trends. Under similar costs functions, or no capacity constraints, the
"outsider" would slightly undercut the price charged by the cartelists. Putting forth a simple
numerical example, the outsider could offer the service for €9.99, to undercut the €10 offered
by the selected cartelist winner. Leaving the analysis at this stage would mislead the reader in
thinking that the Commission was not being overcharged for the service. Yet, had the cartel
not been in force, fierce competition between the cartelists would have taken place and it
would have lowered the final price the Commission paid: if the cartel had not been in force,
the cartelists would have offered a lower price than €9.99, facing each other’s competitive
constraint. Most likely, the cartel created an "umbrella effect" allowing non-cartelists to
overcharge their contracts. The cartelist priced the winning bid at €10 because it allowed
them to benefit from an overcharge that would have not been possible in the absence of the
cartel.
As explained above,38 given the cartel duration, and rationally assuming a number of
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advantageous variables for the cartelists (otherwise the cartel would have not been
sustainable in the long run), such as lower costs, economies of scale or output constraints as
compared to the outsider, we can fairly assume that the Commission would have ended
paying a lower price than the one it paid to the cartel outsider.39
This strategy of repeatedly undercutting the bid by the outsider would, however, likely be
swiftly discovered and might therefore finally lead to tacit collusion or oligopolistic
interdependence in a highly concentrated market, such as the one at case. Nevertheless, this
behaviour escapes antitrust liability under the Wood Pulp precedent.40
Finally, assuming the contrary situation where the outsider is not aware of the cartel or its
effects on price, the consequences of a one-stage game as assumed before, is transposable
to an infinite repeated game, (i.e. an indefinite number of auctions) because the outsider
does not represent a competitive constraint to the cartel.
5. Conclusion
With the proceedings before the Brussels Court, the Commission emphasised its growing
need to promote claims for damages for infringements of EU competition law. Ahead of the
implementation of the Damages Directive, and with its own infringement decision in hand,
this claim seemed to be an easy exercise for the Commission to recoup the allegedly unlawful
overcharge paid for the maintenance contracts.
Proof of incurred damages and causation were at the core of the proceedings. Although the
Damages Directive will innovate in several important respects, such as the implementation of
the rebuttable presumption of damages, causation and quantification of harm remain to the
sole discretion of the national judges. Those principles, assessed under national law, have
proven to be difficult to substantiate in the realm of incomplete bid-rigging cartels.
Consequently, a question that remains uncertain—for now—is about the strategy that the
Commission will follow (if it does) on appeals. In our understanding, the Commission will
need to individually quantify the surplus paid in each contract, and globally address the
concerns that the appeals court may have with incomplete bid-rigging cartels.
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